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The present research examines a unique motivator of prosocial intentions and behavior: the need 
to believe that the world is an orderly, predictable place. Previous social psychological research 
has explained helping behavior as due to either empathic concern for victims (e.g., Batson et al., 
1981) or a desire to relieve one‟s negative affective state (Cialdini, et al., 1973). Drawing on 
recent research on compensatory control, I suggest that the act of helping others may be a means 
through which people compensate for threats to their belief in a controlled and orderly social 
world. The results of the current studies indicate that, when the belief in an orderly world is 
threatened, helping behavior can serve as a means for restoring perceptions of control. 
Specifically, I found that: a threat to personal control increased intentions to give blood at a 
blood donor drive (Study 1); a threat to order in the world increased helping intentions, and was 
not moderated by individual differences in socially-desirable responding (Study 2); providing 
participants with an unrelated opportunity to affirm personal control eliminated the effects of 
control threat on helping intentions (Study 3); and the effect of control threat on helping behavior 
was moderated by individual differences in aversion to unpredictability (Study 4). Implications 
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Every few months, it seems, a natural disaster strikes somewhere in the world. From a 
tsunami in Southeast Asia, to Hurricane Katrina, to an earthquake in Haiti, we are regularly 
confronted with acts of nature that cost lives and livelihoods. What is particularly remarkable 
about these disasters beyond the devastation is the consistent outpouring of support – financial 
and otherwise – from people around the world. In the two months following the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake, for example, $2.2 billion was donated worldwide (CBC, 2010); following the 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, $14 billon was donated (CBC, 2006). Given that most 
donators are far removed from these disasters and their victims, and the presumed self-interested 
nature of homo economicus, how can we explain such behavior? Previous accounts of prosocial 
behavior would suggest that people likely contributed, in part, because they genuinely 
empathized with the victims (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Coke, 
Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Toi & Batson, 1982) and wanted to alleviate their suffering (Lerner, 
1980), and, in part, because donators wished to alleviate any guilt, sadness or negativity they 
may have felt as a result of seeing others suffer (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Cialdini & 
Kenrick, 1976; Cialdini, Schaller, Houlihan, Arps, & Fultz, 1987). Without disputing these 
accounts, I draw on recent research on processes of compensatory control to propose and test a 
novel potential motivation for this sort of prosocial behavior.  
Compensatory Control 
People are often motivated to perceive a sense of personal control over their social 
environments and outcomes (Kelly, 1955; Perkins, 1968; Presson & Banassi, 1996; Seligman, 
1975, 1976; Skinner, 1995; White, 1959; but see Burger, 1989). Theorists have proposed that 
one source of this motivation is people‟s desire to avoid perceiving their social world as random 
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or chaotic. Such perceptions can be psychologically stressful and anxiety-provoking (e.g., 
Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Pennebaker & Stone, 2004; van den Bos & Lind, 2002). People prefer to 
view their social worlds as structured and orderly (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996; Landau et al., 2004, Landau, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Martens, 2006). 
Consequently, the motivation to perceive personal control is considered a sub-goal of the larger 
and more inclusive motivation to defend against perceptions of randomness and chaos within the 
social environment. It is also clear, however, that perceptions of personal control, the motivation 
to achieve such perceptions, and the positive effects of such perceptions all fluctuate greatly 
across situations and people (e.g., Burger, 1989; Burger & Cooper, 1979; Iyengar & Lepper, 
1999; Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Pepitone & Saffiotti, 1997; Rodin, 
Rennert, & Solomon, 1980; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984; Wohl & Enzle, 2003). How 
might people maintain beliefs in order and structure, and defend against perceptions of 
randomness, in the face of fluctuating perceptions of personal control? 
The model of compensatory control suggests that the belief in personal control and the 
belief that things are under control are interchangeable (Antonovsky, 1979); both beliefs are 
capable of insulating the self from feelings of randomness and chaos. According to the 
compensatory control model, people flexibly and interchangeably draw on both the self (personal 
control) and the external environment (external sources of control) to preserve their faith in a 
non-random, controlled world (Kay et al., 2008). In support of this model, researchers have 
demonstrated that threats to personal and external control cause compensatory control strivings, 
including increased faith in external sources of control (e.g., supernatural order, government 
control, religious belief), increased attempts to exert personal control, increased illusions of 
personal control, and increased perceptions of order in random arrays (Kay et al., 2008; Kay, 
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Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009; Sullivan, 
Landau, & Rothschild, 2010; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Compensatory control efforts are 
motivated by the anxiety elicited by perceptions of randomness and disorder (Kay et al., 2008; 
Kay, et al., 2009; Kay, et al., 2010; Kay, Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2009; Laurin, Kay, & 
Moscovitch, 2008; Sullivan et al., 2010). In other words, reminders of randomness – whether 
they originate from the external world (e.g., a threat to the orderliness of the universe) or from 
the self (e.g., a failure to exert personal control) – tend to elicit compensatory reactions aimed at 
re-establishing perceptions of order and non-randomness. Furthermore, researchers (Shepherd, 
Kay, Landau, & Keefer, 2011) have demonstrated the specificity of compensatory control 
reactions to threats to order and control. Other types of threat, such as those to mortality or 
uncertainty do not elicit compensatory control reactions. 
 There are many threats to perceptions of the world as an orderly, predictable place. 
Natural disasters are one example of these threats, but there exist many more examples that do 
not involve death, destruction, or even negativity. Headlines about unexpected fluctuations in the 
stock market, news about lottery winners, or heart-warming stories of chance encounters 
between long-lost friends confront us on daily basis. Indeed, even reminders of randomness that 
are affectively positive – insofar as they, too, pose a threat to the belief that one‟s personal world 
is under control – have been shown to trigger compensatory control reactions (Kay et al., 2008).  
Do Compensatory Control Motivations Contribute to Helping Behavior? 
Engaging in helping behavior is one way of exerting personal control. Helping others, 
when defined as intending to provide them some benefit (Dovidio, 1984), gives people the 
opportunity to influence an outcome, which is a key component of personal control. Helping 
necessarily involves an attempt to influence another person‟s life – contributing money to 
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earthquake victims is intended to help them recover, donating blood is intended to help others 
survive accidents and surgeries. These attempts to benefit others allow people to feel as though 
they have control over something, and exerting control over the environment is one of the 
pathways to a strong sense of control (Shapiro, Schwartz, & Astin, 1996). Indeed, Gray (2010) 
demonstrated that donating to charity literally conferred greater agency to people, allowing them, 
for example, to hold a weight for a longer time period. Thus, when people act to benefit others, 
they feel greater self-control, tenacity, and physical strength, all of which are theoretically related 
to feelings of personal control.  
If helping behavior represents a potential means of compensatory control, then people‟s 
inclinations to help may increase following experiences that suggest their world is random or 
unpredictable. These experiences need not be exceptional cases, such as natural disasters, that are 
explicitly connected to the helping domain. Imagine, for example, that Sarah‟s morning 
newspaper contains a story about unexpected fluctuations in the stock market. Later, while 
walking to work, a Red Cross canvasser stops her to ask for a donation. Still feeling somewhat 
anxious about the unpredictability that she read about, and needing to re-establish a feeling that 
the world is controllable, Sarah reaches for her cheque book. I suggest that making a charitable 
donation allows Sarah to cope with the anxiety she experienced after reading about randomness 
in the stock market. Although it may not be a conscious process, Sara donates because helping 
others allows her to feel control over something.  
Importantly, I am not suggesting that increased helping will occur simply as a function of 
intentions to “do good” (e.g., donate to the Red Cross) after learning about something bad (e.g., 
the stock market is crashing). Nor am I suggesting this compensatory process is motivated by an 
urge to balance, or compensate for, the badness in the world with some goodness (although I do 
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not deny that that may also occur). Instead, I suggest that people will be more likely to engage in 
helping behavior following control threats because helping behavior enables them to restore a 
sense that the world can be controlled. To the extent this hypothesis is valid, I predict that 
increases in helping behavior should follow control threats that include positive, and not only 
negative, events, and that increases in helping should abate when people are provided with an 
alternative means to restore perceptions of control. 
 I am also not suggesting that increased helping behavior will occur because people want 
to “fix” a specific problem (although, again, I am not denying that this, too, does occur). Helping 
can serve as a means of compensatory control so long as it restores feelings of control in general, 
regardless of whether or not doing so serves to resolve the initial threat. As such, threatening 
control, through any means, should engender increased helping behavior, even if the threat is not 
related to the helping behavior (cf. Cialdini, Darby & Vincent, 1973). This theorizing further 
suggests that helping behavior can be initiated, for compensatory control reasons, even when 
people are not confronted with any suffering victims. This prediction is in contrast to other 
approaches that suggest that helping behavior only serves a specific emotional state if it 
addresses the original source of that emotion. Dovidio, Allen, and Schroeder (1990), for instance, 
found that empathic concern associated with a specific problem evoked altruistic motivation only 
toward that problem.  
The compensatory control approach can also be distinguished from much of the past 
work specifically investigating helping behavior in response to people in need. A large majority 
of past research on helping behavior has focused on whether helping is selfless (e.g., Batson et 
al., 1981; Batson et al., 1988; Piliavin & Charng, 1990; Schroeder, Dovidio, Sibicky, Matthews, 
& Allen, 1988) or selfish (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1987; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 
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1997). Although I do posit here a relatively selfish motivation for helping others – regulating the 
anxiety associated with perceiving randomness and chaos – the current research is not intended 
to address this debate.  Unlike much of the work by Batson et al. (1981) and Cialdini et al. 
(1987), the helping behavior that interests me does not necessarily remove the source of the 
threat. I introduced this paper by evoking examples of natural disasters involving considerable 
loss of life, but reminders of randomness in the world need not involve victims. Any reminder of 
randomness poses a threat to perceptions of control. From a compensatory control perspective, 
therefore, helping behavior need not address the source of the threat, or even involve a need-
based situation at all. This theoretical dissociation of the threat from the helping context allowed 
me to conduct conservative tests of the effect of reminders of randomness on helping behavior. 
 The literature on belief in a just world (BJW) has also focused on people‟s desires to 
alleviate the suffering of victims (e.g., Haynes & Olson, 2006). Innocent victims threaten other 
people‟s belief in a just world because the innocence of the victims violates the belief that people 
get what they deserve (Lerner, 1977, 1980). In order to restore beliefs in deservingness and 
justice, people respond to innocent victims by offering help (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). From a 
BJW perspective, helping is a means of maintaining the helpers‟ beliefs that their own outcomes 
will be just (Zuckerman, 1975). From the perspective of compensatory control, however, people 
should be motivated to alleviate others‟ suffering to the extent that doing so allows them to 
restore a sense of personal control, rather than maintain the balance of deservingness. 
Overview of Studies 
In five studies, I manipulated perceptions of either personal or external control and 
observed the effect on helping intentions and behaviors. Studies 1 and 2 capture the phenomenon 
of interest and Studies 3-4 conceptually replicate this phenomenon and provide evidence that it is 
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motivated by compensatory control strivings. In Study 1, I showed that remembering instances in 
which personal control was limited (even when these memories are positive in valence) 
increased intentions to give blood at a clinic during the following week. In Study 2, I replicated 
the findings of Study 1 with different operationalizations of the independent and dependent 
variables and different participants. In Study 3, I explicitly linked the effect of increased helping 
to need for control by demonstrating that prosocial intentions did not increase if people were 
provided an alternative means through which to exert personal control after an external control 
threat. In Study 4, I offered further evidence of the presumed motivational account: the effect of 
an external control threat on donating food to combat world hunger was moderated by individual 
differences in the extent to which people can tolerate randomness and unpredictability. In Study 
5, I sought to demonstrate that the effects of Study 4 were due to a specific desire to restore 















I have reasoned that certain types of helping behavior may be elicited, at least in part, by 
motivations to compensate for threats to beliefs that the world is an orderly, non-random place. 
This account implies that prosocial behavior should increase following a manipulation that 
threatens any of the means through which people commonly protect the cherished belief that the 
world is controllable. In Study 1, I employed a simple two-cell design, in which I first threatened 
beliefs in personal control and then observed the effects on prosocial intentions, operationalized 
as participants‟ intentions to give blood the following week.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited from a public venue on campus in exchange for a 
chocolate bar. Participants who knew that they were ineligible to give blood were excluded, as 
were three participants whose scores on the main dependent measure differed from the mean by 
more than two standard deviations. The final sample consisted of 40 students at the University of 
Waterloo (27 men, 13 women). Their mean age was 20.6 years.  
Procedure. Participants were invited to take part in a study of factors affecting the 
likelihood of blood donation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions that 
constituted the manipulation of control. Half of the participants were asked to write a short 
paragraph about a recent positive event over which they had no control (control threat condition): 
“Please try to think of something positive that happened to you in the past few months that was 
not your fault (i.e., that you had absolutely no control over).” They were asked to write about 
that event using no more than 100 words. This condition was intended to threaten participants‟ 
perceptions of personal control. The remaining participants wrote about a positive event over 
which they had control. Previous research has shown that this manipulation alters feelings of 
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personal control without affecting self-esteem, or positive and negative moods (Kay et al., 2008). 
Participants then read that many Canadians require blood at some point in their lives and 
completed a questionnaire, in which was embedded the primary measure of interest – willingness 
to donate blood the following week. Five items (α = .87) assessed participants‟ desire and 
willingness to give blood at the blood drive, as well as their intentions to sign up for a timeslot 
(“I want to give blood next week,” “I have no interest in giving blood,” (reverse-coded) “I plan 
to give blood next week,” “I will sign up for a time to give blood,” “When I am done this study, I 
will go to the Turnkey desk to sign up for a time to give blood.”). Participants responded to the 
items on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Higher numbers indicated greater 
willingness to donate blood the following week.   
Results 
 Reading of the events revealed that all events recalled were positive (common responses 
across conditions included events like finding money or obtaining a good grade on an exam). A 
one-way ANOVA on willingness to give blood revealed the predicted main effect of control 
threat, F(1, 38) = 5.25, p = .03, partial η
2
 = .12. Participants were more willing to give blood 
when their sense of personal control was experimentally threatened (M = 4.36) than when it was 
not (M = 3.23).  
Discussion 
 Threatening participants‟ sense of personal control caused them to express greater 
willingness to give blood. Although the dependent measure was not behavioral, it did ask 
participants about a behavior they intended to perform in the next week.  
Why did remembering a time when they lacked control over a positive event cause 
participants to express greater willingness to give blood? I suggest that the control threat 
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motivated participants to seek opportunities to restore perceptions of control. They compensated 
for their reduced sense of control by increasing their willingness to help others, a behavior that 
would allow them to exert some degree of control over the world. Although the results of Study 
1 support this specific motivational account, it is possible that the increase in intentions to help 
occurred for reasons other than the one I suggest.  
An alternative explanation of these findings is that participants in the control threat 
condition may have felt undeserving of the unexpected positive event, causing them to restore 
the balance of deservingness with a good deed (Gaucher, Hafer, Davidenko, & Kay, 2010). 
Other interpretations are also possible. For example, perhaps participants found it difficult to 
remember a time when they lacked control over a positive event. If so, the difficulty of recall 
might have led participants to infer they normally possessed a great deal of personal control 
(Schwarz et al., 1991). Therefore, the effects observed in the control threat condition may not 
have been due to increased needs to engage in compensatory control efforts, as I surmised. 
Instead the effects may reveal that participants in the control threat condition experienced 
increased control and believed that by giving blood they “could really make a difference.”
1
  
To address these concerns, I used a different manipulation of control in Study 2. Rather 
than directly manipulating personal control, I used a manipulation developed by Gray and 
Wegner (2010) to threaten the idea that events in the world can be explained. According to Gray 
and Wegner, an unexplained event suggests a lack of control in the world. That threat, then, 
should be just as effective at eliciting helping as the personal control threat. 
                                                 
1
 Previous pre-testing (Kay et al., 2008), however, has demonstrated that this exact personal control manipulation 
does in fact lower personal control and does not cause generalized contrast effects. 
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It is also possible that the control threat did not engender more helping behavior 
specifically – which has been previously associated with agency – but rather increased 
participants‟ concerns with being nice or acting in socially-desirable ways. To address this 
concern in Study 2, I measured individual differences in socially-desirable responding to 
evaluate whether control threat differentially affects people who score low and high in social 
desirability. If control threat does not interact with individual differences in social desirability, I 
can be relatively confident that the effect is not due to concerns about self-presentation. 
Additionally, I measured helping intentions at a general level to demonstrate that the effect of 
control threat was not limited to donating blood.  
Finally, in Study 1, participants were explicitly told that I was interested in factors 
affecting likelihood of giving blood. Although participants were led to believe the paragraph they 
generated at the beginning of the study was simply a measure of their background characteristics, 
participants knew that it was related in some way to the helping measures they later completed. 
To reduce the concern that participants‟ knowledge of the purpose of the study affected their 
responses, in subsequent studies I avoided drawing participants‟ attention to the measure of 
helping. I also recruited a sample of American participants online to demonstrate that the effect 











Participants. Participants were recruited online via Mechanical Turk in exchange for 50 
cents each. Participants were 139 (64 men, 74 women, 1 unspecified) US residents, with a mean 
age of 33.2 years.
2
 
 Procedure. Participants read that they would take part in a study of “reactions to events,” 
which would involve answering questions regarding their opinions about the world, their 
personality, and responding to a short passage. First, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions that constituted the manipulation of control (see Gray & Wegner, 2010). All 
participants read a brief story about the Millers and their dog, whose picnic was disrupted by the 
flooding of a river. To threaten control, I assigned a random half of the participants to read that 
the sudden flood was unexplained. In the no-threat condition, participants read that the flood was 
explained by the actions of an angry dam employee.
3
 To enhance the cover story, I included a 
few filler items for participants to evaluate the article (e.g., “The author expressed his/her ideas 
clearly.”) before they completed the dependent measure. 
The dependent measure contained seven items assessing participants‟ willingness and 
desire to engage in helpful activities (α = .83), (“I like to help when I know it will solve a 
problem,” “It is important to me to help others in need,” “I strive to make the world a better 
place,” “If I see someone in distress, I will try to help them,” “I would like a career where I get to 
                                                 
2
 Degrees of freedom differ somewhat throughout because some participants failed to complete all of the measures. 
3
 For exploratory purposes, I manipulated the severity of the event – half of the participants read that the Millers 
drowned and half of the participants read that they simply got wet. Theoretically, I did not expect severity to matter 
because the active ingredient of the effect of interest is perceptions of order. The severity manipulation produced no 
main effect or interaction, so I collapsed over it in all analyses. 
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make a positive difference in the world,” “If I think there is a problem in the world, I will do 
everything I can to fix it,” “The best way to solve a world problem is to take action myself.”). 
Participants responded to the items on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). 
Higher numbers indicated more willingness to help.  
After a filler scale, I assessed socially-desirable responding
4
 using the classic scale 
developed by Crowne and Marlowe (1960). Thirty-three items (α = .79) assessed participants‟ 
propensity to respond in socially desirable ways by asking them to indicate whether the items 
were true or false with respect to them personally. I omitted the second scale item from all 
analyses, because of overlap with the dependent measure of helping (the omitted item reads “I 
never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.”).  
Results  
The helping intention scale was scored by averaging participants‟ responses to the seven 
items (see Table 1 for means within conditions). The social desirability scale was scored by 
coding socially-desirable responses as 1 and summing them.  
I expected threat to increase helping intentions, regardless of individual differences in 
social desirability. To test this prediction, I conducted regression analyses. I effect-coded threat 
(no threat = -1, threat = 1), centered scores on social desirability, and computed the interaction 
with threat. I entered social desirability on the first step of the regression model to control for its 
influence, followed by threat on the second step, and the interaction on the third step. Social 
desirability significantly predicted helping scores, t(128) = 4.22, p < .001, β = .35. More 
                                                 
4
 I assessed social desirability at the end of the study, rather than before the manipulation, to avoid arousing 
suspicions about the true purpose of the study. A one-way ANOVA on social desirability scores revealed that 
participants were no more likely to report socially-desirable responses following threat, F(1, 128) = .002, p = .96, 
partial η
2
 = .00. 
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important, however, the threat variable significantly affected helping scores even when 
controlling for the effect of socially-desirable responding, t(127) = 2.23, p = .03, β = .18. Social 
desirability did not interact with threat on the helping measure, t(126) = .40, p = .69, β = .03.  
Table 1 
Helping Intentions as a Function of Threat Condition in Study 2 
Threat No threat 
7.22 (1.11) 6.79 (1.11) 
Note. Scores are means of the seven items, which were rated on a 9-point scale. Standard 
deviations appear in brackets. 
Discussion 
 The results of this study extend the findings of Study 1 in several ways. Using very 
different operationalizations of the independent and dependent variables, I replicated the finding 
that a threat to order increases willingness to help. These results rule out the possibility raised by 
Study 1 that participants volunteered to help as a way of maintaining their belief in a just world 
in the face of unexpected good fortune. In this study, participants did not personally experience 
any good or bad fortune, so their reported helping intentions were unlikely to be due to a desire 
to restore deservingness in their own lives. I also showed that the effects generalized to a non-
university sample of participants. Finally, I showed that the effects held even when controlling 
for socially-desirable responding. These findings support the hypothesis that the increase in 
support for helping behavior following a control threat is due to a desire to restore order, rather 
than a generalized need to present oneself in a positive light.  
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 The remaining studies hone in on the role of control needs by examining moderators of 
the threat effect. I also address concerns about mechanism in Studies 3-4, which specifically 
























Study 3 was designed to assess the role of control needs in generating helping behavior and 
to address the alternative interpretations noted above. If helping behavior serves as a 
compensatory control resource, then providing people with an opportunity to exert control in an 
entirely unrelated domain – and thereby satiating their need to re-affirm control – should reduce 
control-motivated helping. In Study 3, all participants first read a passage suggesting that the 
world operates according to random principles. This passage should boost participants‟ 
compensatory control needs. Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions. In one experimental condition, they were asked to complete a task that offered them 
an opportunity to exert personal control. Participants in a second condition completed a similar 
task but with the personal control component removed. The remaining participants proceeded 
directly to the dependent measures without completing any prior tasks. Finally, all participants 
were asked about their interest in helping to solve various social problems. I hypothesized that 
control-restoring helping behavior would be significantly reduced in the condition in which 
participants were offered an alternative means for restoring control.   
Method 
 Participants. Forty students at the University of Waterloo (19 men, 21 women) 
participated in exchange for course credit. Participants‟ mean age was 21.0 years.  
 Procedure. Participants participated individually in this laboratory study, which they 
were told concerned memory, problem solving, and personal opinions. First, all participants read 
a passage that constituted the threat to order in the world. They were told to read the passage 
carefully, as they would later have a memory test. Participants believed they were reading a real 
news excerpt, titled “Is Everything Under Control? A Harvard Conference Reveals the Answer.” 
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The passage detailed the results of a recent conference attended by scientists who wished to 
understand the causes of events in the world. Participants read that scientists had concluded that 
the world operates mostly unpredictably and that people‟s behavior does not have clear causes 
(see Appendix A for full text). Following the passage, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of three conditions. In the control-restoration condition, participants completed a 
computerized task that required them to try to control the onset of a green circle (adapted from 
Alloy & Abramson, 1982). The computer program was designed to display a green circle at 
random intervals, but participants were led to believe that they could learn how to control its 
onset by pressing the space bar. The task, then, was designed to afford participants the belief in 
personal control, thereby restoring their perceptions of control. Previous research indicates that 
the task does breed an illusory sense of control (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979). In the filler 
condition, participants completed a variant of the same computerized task that required them to 
indicate, using the keyboard, where the circle appeared on the screen (i.e., left, right, or center). 
This condition was designed to account for the time delay introduced by having some 
participants complete the computer program before continuing to the dependent measures, but 
not to restore a sense of control. This condition also gave participants an opportunity to succeed 
at a task, as in the control-restoration condition. Thus, the tasks were similar in theme, affective 
content, and time required for completion. Following the computer tasks, participants completed 
the dependent measure. In the third condition, participants proceeded immediately to the 
dependent measure with no intervening computerized task. 
 To assess support for helping behavior, I used the seven-item measure from Study 2 of 
participants‟ willingness and desire to engage in helpful activities (α = .90). Participants 
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responded to the items on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Higher numbers 
indicated more willingness to help.  
Results 
 I expected participants to be less willing to help when they had a chance to restore their 
perceptions of control during the computerized task. A one-way ANOVA on helping intentions 
revealed a main effect of control-restoration condition, F(2, 37) = 3.54, p = .04, partial η
2
 = .16 
(see Table 2 for means). As predicted, participants reported less interest in helping following the 
control-restoration task compared to following the filler task, F(1, 37) = 4.36, p = .04, or no-task 
control conditions, F(1, 37) = 6.30, p = .02. The latter two conditions did not differ significantly 
from each other, F(1, 37) = .07, p = .79.  
Table 2 
 Helping Intentions as a Function of Condition in Study 3 
No task  Control-restoring task  Filler task  
7.32 (.91) 5.98 (1.95) 7.06 (1.01) 
Note. Scores are means of the seven items, which were rated on a 9-point scale. Standard 
deviations appear in brackets. 
Discussion 
When participants (all of whom were exposed to information about randomness in the 
world) were provided with an opportunity to restore control in a domain entirely unrelated to 
helping behavior, their helping intentions decreased. This decrease occurred when compared to a 
condition in which participants were asked about helping intentions directly after the randomness 
exposure, and when compared to a condition that included a filler task designed to be as similar 
to the control-restoration task as possible. The findings provide support for the hypothesized 
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compensatory control explanation of helping behavior. Furthermore, these findings are difficult 
to explain from the perspective of belief in a just world. All of the participants were exposed to a 
very general threat of randomness, which did not involve any injustice to the self or others. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that engaging in the control-restoring task would alleviate any 
justice concerns that might have arisen. These results suggest that, by increasing feelings of 
control, the control-restoring task obviated the need for participants to compensate for the threat 
of randomness by expressing their willingness to help. 
In Study 4, I sought to provide triangulating evidence for the specific motivational 
perspective using a different methodological approach. I also provided a behavioral measure of 

















In the face of reminders of randomness, which are presumed to arouse anxiety (but not 
general negative affect, see Kay et al., 2008), I suggest people engage in increased helping 
behavior as a means of re-establishing feelings of control. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that 
control threats increased helping intentions compared to a baseline condition. Study 3 
demonstrated that, in the context of a reminder of randomness, helping intentions decreased for 
those given the opportunity to affirm their control needs in an unrelated way.  None of these 
studies, however, provided evidence that it is the aversiveness of acknowledging that events are 
random that increased helping behavior. Given that specific emotional threat responses of this ilk 
are difficult to measure (see Proulx & Heine, 2009; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989; Zanna & Cooper, 1974), and therefore not particularly amenable to 
mediational designs, in Study 4 I tested this hypothesis via moderation. Specifically, I explored 
the role of individual differences in aversion to randomness and unpredictability in predicting 
prosocial reactions to reminders of randomness.  
People differ in their aversion to unpredictability (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Greco & Roger, 
2001). If people increase their helping behavior following control threats because these threats 
cause concern over randomness, then the increase in helping should be moderated by the extent 
to which people dislike unpredictability. Those high in aversion to unpredictability should be 
particularly likely to engage in helping behavior following reminders of randomness. Study 4 
tested this specific prediction. I employed a behavioral measure of helping to study increases in 




Participants. The sample consisted of 81 students at the University of Waterloo who 
participated in exchange for course credit. I excluded two participants for suspicion, one 
participant who recognized the manipulation from an unrelated study, one participant who closed 
the Internet browser precluding the research assistant from recording the dependent measure 
(explained below), and three participants who did not agree that world hunger is a problem (as 
indicated by their responses to an item in the questionnaire).
5
 The final sample included 74 
participants (36 men, 37 women, 1 unspecified). Participants‟ mean age was 19.3 years.  
 Procedure. Participants participated individually in this laboratory study, which they 
were told concerned evaluations of media. Participants first completed background information, 
in which were embedded 7 items (α = .79) assessing the extent to which they dislike randomness 
and unpredictable situations (e.g., “Unforeseen events upset me greatly,” and “I can‟t stand being 
taken by surprise.”). These items appear in a subscale validated by Buhr and Dugas (2002) that 
assesses the extent to which people regard unexpected events as aversive. After completing a 
filler scale and demographic questions, participants were then randomly assigned to read one of 
two passages. One passage was the same as that used in Study 3, which constituted the reminder 
of randomness. The second passage was similar, but asserted instead that the world is relatively 
orderly and operates in predictable ways (see Appendix B for full text).  Participants were told to 
read the passage carefully, as they would be asked to evaluate it later.  
After the passage, participants read an information sheet drawn from information 
available on freerice.com. The sheet indicated, correctly, that the website is run by the United 
Nations World Food Programme to provide rice to hungry people. After participants read the 
                                                 
5
 It is unclear what donating rice means to participants who do not think hunger is a problem. Presumably, they do 
not think of the act as helping, so it may not have the control-restoring properties I would expect. 
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information sheet, a research assistant opened an internet browser to freerice.com. She told 
participants to spend as much time interacting with the website as was needed for them to feel 
prepared to evaluate it and then left the room. One option within the website was to choose to 
send 10 grains of rice to the World Food Programme each time participants correctly answered a 
skill-testing question. Participants could answer as many questions as they wished. Participants 
were also free to investigate other aspects of the website, such as reading the associated blog, the 
latest news about world hunger, and perusing the various types of questions (e.g., art, French). 
When participants felt they had spent enough time on the website, they retrieved the research 
assistant who waited in the hallway. The research assistant glanced at the computer screen and 
noted how many grains of rice participants earned, which constituted the measure of helping 
behavior.  
 Participants then completed a questionnaire about their opinions of the website and world 
hunger. Specifically, they rated their agreement with five statements (α = .84) about the efficacy 
of the website [“The freerice website is an effective way of combating world hunger,” “The 
freerice website cannot really help solve world hunger,” (reverse coded) “The freerice website 
helps people in need,” “I can help reduce world hunger by using the freerice website,” and 
“Using the freerice website made me feel like I was solving a problem.”]. I also assessed 
participants‟ perceptions of the significance of world hunger (“World hunger is a big problem.”). 
I included these measures to examine the possibility that any obtained effects could be attributed 
to varying perceptions of the website or of world hunger. Participants indicated their agreement 




Rice Donation. I predicted a 2-way interaction. Participants should donate more grains of 
rice following control threat, but the effects of threat should be especially high among 
participants with an aversion to unpredictability. To test this, I regressed the amount of rice 
donated onto centered aversion to unpredictability scores, the manipulation (effect coded; no 
threat = -1, threat = 1), and the interaction between the two. The analysis revealed a marginal 2-
way interaction between threat and aversion to unpredictability (see Figure 1), t(70) = 1.82, p = 
.07, β = .21. The main effects of threat and aversion to unpredictability were not significant (ps > 
.13). 
To decompose the interaction, I conducted separate regression analyses for participants 
low (i.e., one standard deviation below) and high (i.e., one standard deviation above) in aversion 
to unpredictability (Aiken & West, 1991). For participants low in aversion to unpredictability, 
the effect of threat was not significant, t(70) = -.22, p = .83. For participants high in aversion to 
unpredictability, however, the effect of threat was significant, t(70) = 2.35, p = .02, β = .40. 
Following threat, these participants donated more rice than following no threat. Alternatively 
stated, there was no effect of aversion to unpredictability on rice donation in the no-threat 
condition [t(33) = -1.13, p = .27], but there was a positive (though non-significant) association in 
the threat condition, t(37) = 1.53, p = .14, β = .24.  
Figure 1. Estimated mean number of grains of rice donated as a function of control threat and 




Questionnaire. I submitted the questionnaire items to the same regression analyses as the 
donation measure. Scores on the perceived efficacy composite and beliefs about whether hunger 
is a problem revealed no effects of the manipulation or the individual difference (all ps > .06).   
Discussion 
 Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that control threats increased helping intentions, and Study 
3 demonstrated that helping behavior was reduced when people were first given an alternative 
means of establishing control. In Study 4, the effect of control threat on actual helping behavior 
was moderated by individual differences in the anxiety people feel when confronted with 
unpredictable situations. Participants were more helpful (i.e., donated more rice, in fact, nearly 
twice as many total grains) following a reminder of randomness, but only if they were 
dispositionally high in the extent to which they dislike unpredictability. For those participants 

















 The absence of a significant main effect of control threat is somewhat surprising, given 
the results of the previous studies. One possible explanation is that the dependent measure in this 
study was not framed as a measure of helping, whereas the previous measures were clearly 
linked to helping. Furthermore, although the rice donation truly did help hungry people, 
contributing a few hundred grains of rice may have seemed inconsequential in contrast to the 
significant problem of world hunger. Participants, then, may not have construed their behavior as 
having significant impact on the world, which would reduce the task‟s overall effectiveness at 
restoring a sense of control.  
 Despite the lack of main effect in this study, the findings across the four studies support 
the contention that people engage in helping behavior as a way of coping with the anxiety 
produced by threats to control. The null findings from the questionnaire items suggest that the 
results in Study 4 are not due to systematic differences in perceptions of the efficacy of the 
website or the problem of world hunger. 
 An alternative explanation of the findings from Study 4, however, is that participants 
high in aversion to unpredictability wanted to feel better about themselves following threat, and 
the nature of the freerice website provided that opportunity. Perhaps those participants persisted 
longer at answering questions simply because they felt better when they answered the questions 
correctly, not because helping restored a sense of control. The current data cannot rule out this 
alternative possibility, so I sought to replicate and extend this study in a way that would address 
this alternative explanation. If participants donated more rice simply because it made them feel 
better to succeed at a task following threat, then it should not matter whether or not the task is 
effective at reducing hunger. In contrast, if they donated more rice as a means of restoring 
personal control through helping, then they should only donate more following threat if the task 
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is effective at reducing hunger. In Study 5, I sought to test this hypothesis by varying the degree 

























 The purpose of Study 5 was to replicate and extend the findings of Study 4 by 
incorporating a manipulation of the effectiveness of the helping task. The only difference 
between Studies 4 and 5, then, was the introduction of a manipulation of the effectiveness of the 
freerice website at helping to alleviate suffering. I expected that participants high in aversion to 
unpredictability would be particularly likely to engage in helping behavior following a reminder 
of randomness, but especially when the website was portrayed as effective.  
Method 
Participants. The sample consisted of 184 students at the University of Waterloo who 
participated in exchange for course credit. I excluded 19 participants for suspicion
6
 and four 
participants who did not agree that world hunger is a problem (as indicated by their responses to 
an item in the questionnaire). An additional 22 participants closed the Internet browser before the 
research assistant could record the dependent variable,
7
 so they were necessarily excluded from 
                                                 
6
 Suspicion was assessed in debriefing by the research assistant and was fairly evenly distributed across 
experimental conditions. It is unclear why the suspicion rate was higher in this study than in Study 4, given the 
consistency in the study materials. The research assistants were different for the studies, however, which may 
account for the difference. It is possible, for example, that one research assistant had a lower threshold for 
perceiving suspicion or that participants were more willing to report suspicion to one research assistant. The 
research assistants‟ behavior may have differed across studies, arousing different levels of suspicion. This latter 
explanation is less likely because research assistants followed a standardized experimental script. 
7
 The number of participants who closed the browser was fairly even across experimental conditions. It is unclear 
why so many participants in this study closed the internet browser, as compared to Study 4. I deliberately avoided 
asking participants to leave the browser open because I did not want to arouse their suspicions about the purpose of 




the analyses (they did not differ statistically from the other participants on any background 
characteristics that I measured). The final sample included 139 participants (60 men, 79 women). 
Participants‟ mean age was 19.2 years.  
 Procedure. As in Study 4, participants were told they would complete a study on 
evaluations of media. Participants first completed background information, in which were 
embedded the same 7 items from Study 4 (α = .82) that assessed the extent to which they dislike 
randomness and unpredictable situations. After a filler scale and demographic questions, 
participants were then randomly assigned to read one of the two passages from Study 4 that 
constituted the manipulation of randomness. Participants were told to read the passage carefully, 
as they would be asked to evaluate it later. After reading the passage, participants were asked to 
evaluate a website. Prior to interacting with the website, participants read one of two versions of 
an information sheet about freerice.com, which constituted the manipulation of effectiveness. 
The “effective” version was identical to the information read by participants in Study 4. I added 
two phrases to the “ineffective” version to raise doubts about the effectiveness of the website.  
Specifically, participants read that “The website can alleviate some of the need, but it is not 
entirely effective” and “Some people do benefit from this website, but it cannot eliminate world 
hunger.” As in Study 4, after reading the information sheet, participants were asked to interact 
with the website for as long as they needed to evaluate it. When participants felt they had spent 
enough time on the website, they retrieved the research assistant who waited in the hallway. The 
research assistant glanced at the computer and noted how many grains of rice participants 
donated. Finally, participants completed the same questionnaire from Study 4 about the 
perceived efficacy of the website (α = .76) and their perceptions of the problem of world hunger. 
 Results  
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Rice Donation. I predicted a three-way interaction: participants would donate more grains 
of rice following control threat, but only if they were high in aversion to unpredictability and 
they believed that the website was effective. I regressed the amount of rice donated on centered 
aversion to unpredictability scores, the threat manipulation (effect coded; no threat = -1, threat = 
1), the effectiveness manipulation (effect coded; ineffective = -1, effective = 1) and all of the 
possible interactions.  Aversion to unpredictability was positively related to rice donation, t(131) 
= 2.36, p = .02, β = .21. The other main effects and two-way interactions did not attain 
significance (all ps > .50), nor did the predicted three-way interaction (see Figures 2 and 3), 
t(131) = .11, p = .92, β = .01. This is a particularly difficult interaction to obtain, because I 
predicted that one condition would differ from all of the remaining conditions, which should not 
differ from each other. Thus, despite the non-significant three-way interaction, I explored 
whether there was any evidence to support my predictions. To do so, I decomposed the three-
way interaction by the effectiveness manipulation, which also allowed me to examine whether I 
replicated the effects of Study 4 in the “effective” condition. 
Within the ineffective condition, no effects emerged (all ps > .20). Within the effective 
condition, aversion to unpredictability was positively related to rice donation, t(70) = 2.20, p = 
.03, β = .26. The interaction did not attain significance, t(70) = .30, p = .77, β = .04. An analysis 
of the simple slopes within the effective condition revealed that aversion to unpredictability 
predicted rice donation following threat [t(35) = 2.36, p = .02, β = .37], but not following no 
threat [t(35) = 1.10, p = .28, β = .18]. Within the ineffective condition, aversion to 
unpredictability did not predict rice donation following threat [t(32) = 1.16, p = .25, β = .20] or 
no threat [t(29) = .60, p = .55, β = .11]. 
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In Study 4, participants high in aversion to unpredictability responded to threat with a 
significant increase in rice donation. To test whether that effect replicated in the current study, I 
also conducted regression analyses for participants low (i.e., one standard deviation below) and 
high (i.e., one standard deviation above) in aversion to unpredictability (Aiken & West, 1991) 
within the effective condition. For participants low in aversion to unpredictability, the effect of 
threat was not significant, t(70) = -.15, p = .88. For participants high in aversion to 
unpredictability, the effect of threat was not significant, t(70) = .30, p = .77.  
Figure 2. Estimated mean number of grains of rice donated as a function of threat and individual 
differences in aversion to unpredictability within the effective condition in Study 5.  
 
Figure 3. Estimated mean number of grains of rice donated as a function of threat and individual 






















I submitted the questionnaire items to the same regression analyses as the donation 
measure. I expected a main effect of the effectiveness manipulation on the perceived efficacy of 
the website, but no effects on perceptions of the problem of world hunger. 
Perceived efficacy of the website. Analysis of responses to the composite of items 
evaluating the efficacy of the website did not reveal the anticipated main effect of the 
effectiveness manipulation (p > .70).
8
 
                                                 
8
 The three-way interaction was not significant (p > .40), but the step involving two-way interactions did attain 
significance [F change (3, 132) = 5.17, p = .002, R
2
 change = .11], so I decomposed it to examine the two-way 
interactions. A threat by effectiveness interaction emerged [t(132) = -2.25, p = .03, β = .19], as did an effectiveness 




















World hunger as a problem. Perceptions of world hunger revealed no effects of the 
manipulations or individual difference (all ps > .06). 
Discussion 
 Although the pattern of rice donation within the effective condition resembles that of 
Study 4, the interaction did not attain significance. This failure to replicate is disconcerting, 
given that the experimental materials were identical. One possible explanation is that although 
the number of participants was similar in both studies, the standard deviation of the dependent 
measure in Study 5 (SD = 859.96) was nearly double that of Study 4 (SD = 436.87). A future 
study could address this issue with more participants or a dependent variable not prone to such 
high variance. 
 Unfortunately, the current study also failed to address the concern raised by Study 4 that 
participants higher in aversion to unpredictability donated more rice following threat because 
they enjoyed answering questions on the freerice website. The lack of main effect of the 
effectiveness manipulation on perceived efficacy of the website also suggests that the relatively 
subtle wording difference was insufficient to produce the anticipated differences.  It is 
encouraging, however, that the effects appear less strong in the ineffective condition than in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Decomposing the threat by effectiveness interaction revealed that, in the no-threat condition, perceived efficacy was 
higher in the effective condition than in the ineffective condition [t(64) = 1.85, p = .07, β = .22]. This difference did 
not emerge in the threat condition, t(67) = -1.34, p = .19. 
Decomposing the effectiveness by aversion interaction revealed that participants high in aversion to unpredictability 
perceived greater efficacy in the effective condition than the ineffective condition, t(133) = 2.48, p = .01, β = .30. 
Participants low in aversion to unpredictability perceived greater efficacy in the ineffective condition, t(133) = -2.05, 
p = .04, β = .24. 
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effective condition. A study in which the effectiveness is emphasized more strongly, or 

























In four studies, I demonstrated the role of need for control in fostering helping behavior. 
In Study 1, I directly threatened perceptions of personal control. When feelings of personal 
control were threatened, people espoused a greater willingness to donate blood the following 
week. In Study 2, I threatened the concept of an orderly world, and found that participants were 
more willing to help others as a result. In Study 3, I provided more direct evidence that people 
engage in helping as a means of restoring perceptions of control. When participants were first 
presented with an alternate, non-helping, route to restoring their perceptions of control, they were 
less likely to help following threat. In Study 4, I presented evidence suggesting that people 
engage in helping behavior to reduce the anxiety induced by reminders of randomness and loss 
of control. A reminder of randomness in the world caused participants to donate more rice to 
feed hungry people, but only for those participants who tend to feel anxious in contexts that lack 
predictability. For participants who do not find unpredictability aversive, the randomness 
manipulation did not engender any more helping behavior. In Study 5, I attempted to show that 
the effects were due to a desire to help, rather than to repair one‟s mood.  
The current findings offer a new perspective on helping behavior. Like Cialdini and 
colleagues (1973; 1976; 1987), I suggest that helping behavior can reduce negative feelings. But 
whereas Cialdini and colleagues (1987) focused on the desire to reduce personal sadness that 
arises when confronted with a suffering victim, my findings suggest that people may also engage 
in helping behavior to curb the anxiety associated with perceiving the world as uncontrollable. 
Strikingly, this emotion need not arise from observations of a victim‟s suffering in order to 
influence helping behavior. Although the reminders of randomness employed in my studies were 
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completely dissociated from any specific suffering, the reminders still motivated people to re-
establish control, and the opportunity to help was a convenient means of achieving that goal. 
This research also differs from much of the past work by not using an identifiable victim 
with whom participants were asked to empathize. Previous researchers have focused on 
manipulations of empathy with a victim to facilitate helping (e.g., Batson et al., 1981; 1988; 
Cialdini et al., 1987; Dovidio et al., 1990). I used a very different methodology by manipulating 
control at an abstract level and completely divorcing the manipulation from the helping context. 
It seems unlikely, then, that the current results can be explained by empathic concern.  Even if 
control threats do evoke empathy, such an account would have to explain why participants in 
Study 3 were less willing to help after having their personal control affirmed. Empathy should 
have been equally high across conditions because all participants experienced control threat, and 
the control-restoration task should have done little to reduce empathic concern. A future area for 
research may be to understand the interactive effects of empathy and control needs on helping. 
Perhaps, when need for control is heightened, people may help regardless of whether they 
empathize with the victim. 
Belief in a Just World and Helping Behavior 
My perspective also differs from the BJW literature in several ways. First, that literature 
has focused on victims‟ innocence as a motivator of helping behavior (e.g., Haynes & Olson, 
2006). In contrast, the compensatory control perspective suggests that control threats should 
increase helping, regardless of victims‟ innocence. The act of helping someone in need should 
satisfy control needs, regardless of why the person is in need. In fact, the recipient of help need 
not be a “victim” at all. The compensatory control perspective implies that the effects in this 
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thesis should replicate in helping scenarios that do not focus on individuals directly (e.g., 
donating to environmental causes). Future research could address this question directly.  
Second, BJW would have a hard time explaining why reading about general randomness 
in the world would increase helping intentions. Threats to belief in a just world usually involve a 
violation of justice or deservingness. Admittedly, the manipulations in Studies 1 and 2 may have 
evoked deservingness concerns. Participants in Study 1, for example, may have interpreted the 
positive event as a good break. According to Gaucher and colleagues (2010), reminders of such 
an event may have increased helping as a means of compensating for the good break. However, 
the randomness manipulation in Studies 3-5 had no justice or deservingness overtones and was 
not linked to the helping situation. For participants, then, there was no threat to the belief in a 
just world, and so no need to repair it.  
Perceived Efficacy and Helping Behavior 
How do my findings align with previous work on perceptions of efficacy and helping? 
Research on efficacy indicates that people need to feel as though their efforts will make a 
difference before they will help. For example, Oliner and Oliner (1988) noted that individuals 
who did, versus did not, rescue Jews during the Holocaust tended to have a greater sense of self-
efficacy. That feeling of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977) allowed them to believe that their rescue 
efforts would be successful. Likewise, in a series of experiments, Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 
(1994; 1997) found that people were less likely to help their group in a social dilemma when 
they believed that their contribution would have little effect on the common good.  
Note that the perceived-efficacy perspective, then, is an informational approach, in which 
people judge whether they should help based on whether they think their efforts will be 
worthwhile. My approach, on the other hand, is motivational: I argue that people are more likely 
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to help when they are more motivated to believe the world is controllable. This distinction raises 
an interesting question: Why, when I presented participants with information that the world is 
random, did participants respond with increased motivation to help, as predicted, rather than a 
decreased willingness to help, as would be predicted by the perceived-efficacy approach? 
Although I cannot definitively answer this question without more data, this distinction is 
theoretically reconcilable.  
One explanation is that the helping opportunities provided in the perceived-efficacy 
research are often directly tied to the manipulation of the independent variables. Participants 
were explicitly told the likelihood their specific helping behavior would affect the common good 
(Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994, 1997). Such a methodology – in sharp contrast to mine, which 
did not directly tie manipulations of randomness to the helping behavior the participants were 
asked to consider – likely generated a rational, deliberate mindset, in which participants decided 
whether or not they should help as a function of whether or not helping would be effective. This 
explicit, deliberative process account is consistent with other research demonstrating that, when 
people explain why they help, they often consciously draw on beliefs regarding perceived 
efficacy (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). In my studies, I purposely divorced the manipulations of 
control from the helping situation, making it much more likely that the effects of the control 
manipulation triggered unconscious, automatic motivational systems, rather than reason-based 
decision making processes. Such an interpretation is consistent with models of automatic goal 
pursuit.  
This reasoning may explain at least some of the null results of Study 5. In that study, I 
pitted the control threat against the effectiveness manipulation. I expected the control threat to 
increase motivation to help, but only when participants used the information about effectiveness 
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of the website to conclude that their efforts would be worthwhile. The informational 
manipulation may not have been strong enough to overwhelm the motivational manipulation. 
The data on perceived efficacy of the website supports this contention. In the no-threat condition 
(i.e., when control needs were low), the effectiveness manipulation did produce the expected 
difference in perceptions of efficacy. That effect did not occur in the threat condition (i.e., when 
control needs were high). Perhaps control needs were so high in the threat condition that the 
informational manipulation was not strong enough to influence perceptions and behavior. Further 
research with a stronger manipulation of effectiveness is needed to resolve this issue. 
Compensatory Control and Helping Behavior 
 What is it about helping behavior that restores a sense of control? Helping behavior is an 
effective means of restoring perceptions of control because it gives people the opportunity to 
control an outcome. As Gray (2010) demonstrated, helping others confers a sense of agency. 
This suggests that helping that more directly restores control, such as by solving a problem 
(rather than just chipping away at a perennial issue), might be particularly potent for restoring a 
sense of control. My studies provide some support for this idea. In Study 1, for example, 
participants were presented with the opportunity to participate in a blood drive. Although the 
need for blood donations is constant, I focused participants on the need for people to sign up for 
a particular blood drive the following week. Presenting the blood drive as an isolated event might 
have made it seem more appealing in terms of control-restoration because participants could 
“solve” the problem by signing up to give blood. Similarly, in Studies 2 and 3, I asked questions 
about participants‟ desires to help “when it will solve a problem.” Thus, I directly assessed their 
desire to help in ways that would restore a sense of control. Studies 4 and 5 are less clear with 
respect to the control-restoring nature of the helping task. Participants recognized that world 
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hunger is an ongoing problem that will not be easily solved. Furthermore, their donation of a few 
hundred grains of rice would constitute only a minor contribution. Participants, then, may have 
felt that their behavior was not particularly effective. The information sheet about the website did 
indicate, however, that “Somewhere in the world, a person is eating rice that you helped 
provide.” Thus, participants may have imagined an individual eating rice because of their 
specific efforts. Finally, the mean endorsement of the efficacy of the website at alleviating world 
hunger was relatively high, suggesting that participants thought it did contribute to solving the 
problem.  
The current findings also contribute to the understanding of compensatory control (Kay et 
al., 2008). First, they suggest another route by which people can restore the belief that their 
personal worlds are under control. Previous work has focused on endorsement of the 
government, a belief in a controlling God, perceptions of patterns, and even the belief in 
controlling enemies (Kay et al., 2008; Kay, et al., 2010; Laurin, et al., 2008; Sullivan, et al., 
2010; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) as ways of compensating for a reduction in control. My 
research provides evidence of a much more prosocial way through which people can restore 
perceptions of control.  
Second, this is the first evidence for behavioral consequences of compensatory control 
processes. Previous work has focused on the cognitive gymnastics that people undertake to 
believe that their worlds are under control, but never behavior or even behavioral intentions. In 
Study 4, I showed that heightened control needs caused participants to actually donate more rice 
to hungry people. Control needs, then, can be satisfied both cognitively and behaviorally. I also 
demonstrated that compensatory control tendencies are moderated by individual differences that 
are theoretically related to control needs. I expected individual differences in aversion to 
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unpredictability to moderate the effect of threat because this individual difference reflects how 
people cope with the ambiguities and randomness of life (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). In Study 4, only 
participants who were high in aversion to unpredictable situations responded to a reminder of 
randomness in the world with greater helping behavior. This type of theoretically-consistent 
moderation has not been previously demonstrated in the compensatory control literature. 
Although the control threat tended to increase rice donation in Study 4, that main effect 
was not significant. As noted above, a possible explanation for this lack of effect is due to how 
participants may have construed the rice-donation task. In the pursuit of experimental control, I 
used an abstract control threat, which was unrelated to the helping context. To reduce social 
desirability concerns, I avoided drawing participants‟ attention to the fact that they were 
completing a dependent measure of helping behavior. In real life, however, people know when 
they are helping others. Although people may not recognize the motivation for their behavior, 
they know that writing cheques to the Red Cross, for example, will alleviate at least some 
suffering in the world. The perception that their actions affect others should be particularly 
potent for restoring perceptions of control. Future research, then, might try to strike a greater 
balance between experimental control and realism to understand how these processes occur 
outside of the laboratory.  
Limitations 
Before concluding, I note three limitations to the studies presented here. First, I did not 
provide direct evidence that the threats increased anxiety. Past research, however, has 
demonstrated that threats very similar to the ones employed here produce anxiety (Kay, et al., 
2010; Laurin, et al., 2008), and, as observed in Study 4, only those individuals who find 
randomness emotionally aversive responded to the threat by trying to restore perceptions of 
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control. Lacking direct evidence for the proposed mediator of anxiety, however, raises the 
possibility that the effects can be explained by other mediators, including general negative affect. 
Although the manipulation used in Study 1 has been shown not to affect negative mood (Kay et 
al., 2008), it is possible that the manipulations in the latter studies did more than arouse anxiety. I 
did not conduct a mediational-chain study involving anxiety because assessments of these 
specific types of emotional reactions can be difficult to measure (see Proulx & Heine, 2009; 
Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Zanna & Cooper, 1974) and designs employing statistical mediation are 
subject to criticism (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). However, a future study could attempt a 
traditional mediational-chain design, or a manipulation of anxiety, to obtain direct evidence of 
mechanism. 
Second, the alternative explanation from Study 4 lingers because of the null results in 
Study 5. Did participants high in aversion to unpredictability donate more rice following threat 
because it helped restore a sense of control, or because it alleviated their negative mood? My 
current data cannot rule out the alternative explanation, but the pattern of data in the 
“ineffective” condition is informative. If the effects were due to a desire for mood repair, threat 
should cause an increase in rice donation, regardless of the efficacy of the website. In the 
“ineffective” condition, however, there was a trend for participants high in aversion to 
unpredictability to donate more in the no-threat condition. I cannot make too much of these non-
significant effects, but they do suggest another study with a stronger manipulation of efficacy is 
warranted. Another way to address this concern about mood repair is to simply measure mood 
after the control threat to determine whether threat differentially impacts the moods of people 
high and low in aversion to unpredictability. Mood could also be measured after the donation 
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task to determine whether it is a more potent positive-mood induction for people high in aversion 
to unpredictability. 
Finally, none of the studies included a completely neutral baseline condition. Thus, 
although I assume that the “threat” conditions increased people‟s helpfulness, it could be that the 
“no threat” conditions reduced desires to help. Although the theoretical point is unaffected by 
this ambiguity – regardless of whether affirmation reduces helping or threat increases helping, 
the effect would indicate a compensatory control process – I think it is much more likely the 
effect was driven by the threat conditions than the reverse. People tend to assume some level of 
orderliness, predictability, and personal control in their lives. As such, the no-threat conditions, 
which involved asking participants to think about something that was under their control or 
telling them the world operates according to orderly principles, was more likely just a reminder 
of their default assumptions. In addition, past research that has compared the effects of 
randomness primes to neutral conditions has demonstrated that exposure to randomness 
information drives compensatory control effects (Kay, et al., 2010). 
Implications 
I introduced the current research by reflecting on a multitude of recent natural disasters 
that evoked billions of dollars in donations, and countless hours of volunteerism. How does the 
current research inform an understanding of how people respond to natural disasters? To make 
the experimental tests as straightforward and conservative as possible, I chose not to embed 
randomness threats within natural disasters themselves, which naturally manipulate a slew of 
emotions and concerns. Nonetheless, the findings shed some light on why such disasters elicit 
such an outpouring of support. In the face of seemingly random tsunamis and unpredictable 
earthquakes, it can be difficult to maintain the perception that one‟s personal world is under 
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control. To maintain that perception, it is sometimes necessary to take matters into one‟s own 
hands, as many people did when they flew to Thailand or New Orleans to help rebuild. Given 
that natural disasters generally remind people of the capriciousness of nature, perhaps some 
proportion of the massive support they engender comes from the need to restore perceptions of 
order these disasters themselves activate, and the efficacy of helping behavior for satisfying this 
goal.  
The current findings also have consequences for how charitable organizations can frame 
requests for help. It seems likely that requests that highlight the random, or unexpected, nature of 
a problem might be particularly effective in eliciting help. For example, the Red Cross might 
remind people that natural disasters, like the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, can strike without 
any warning. The Heart and Stroke Foundation could profile a father who suddenly suffered a 
stroke while getting his children ready for school one morning. Furthermore, portraying helping 
in a way that restores control (e.g., building a house for Habitat for Humanity will solve 
homelessness for a family) might be more effective than helping that does not (e.g., building a 
house for Habitat for Humanity is a nice thing to do). 
Concluding Remarks  
Helping behavior, which seemingly has little benefit for the giver, has traditionally 
proved difficult for social scientists to explain and understand. Previous research has suggested 
that people may help others out of genuine empathic concern (e.g., Batson et al., 1981), concern 
for deservingness (Lerner, 1980), or a need to relieve their own sadness (e.g., Cialdini et al., 
1987). Like most social phenomena, however, helping behavior is undoubtedly multiply-
determined. The current set of studies is the first to explore how the broad motivation to maintain 
a belief in a controlled and orderly world can foster helping behavior. This research provides a 
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novel means for explaining a still inadequately understood type of social behavior and for 
























Appendix A: Full Text of Threat Passage used in Studies 3-5 
Is Everything Under Control? A Harvard Conference Reveals the Answer 
 
“The world really is a random place,” said Thomas Cornwallis, a statistics professor at 
Oxford. Cornwallis made the comments at a conference hosted by Harvard University in 
January. The conference, titled “Understanding the World” was aimed at trying to understand the 
causes of events in the world.  Cornwallis was one of several panellists who agreed that the 
world mostly operates in erratic, unpredictable ways. 
At the same conference, Marten Keese, a professor at Utrecht University in the Netherlands, 
spoke about an article he published in the renowned journal Science. Keese claimed that people‟s 
behaviour does not have clear causes. Although people may believe that the world is orderly and 
non-random, Keese says our perceptions are flawed. “Unperceived factors determine what 
happens to us. Most people believe their outcomes are under control, but our data suggest that 



















Appendix B: Full Text of No-Threat Passage used in Studies 4-5 
Is Everything Under Control? A Harvard Conference Reveals the Answer 
 
“The world really is an orderly place,” said Thomas Cornwallis, a statistics professor at 
Oxford. Cornwallis made the comments at a conference hosted by Harvard University in 
January. The conference, titled “Understanding the World” was aimed at trying to understand the 
causes of events in the world. Cornwallis was one of several panellists who agreed that the world 
mostly operates in stable, understandable patterns. 
At the same conference, Marten Keese, a professor at Utrecht University in the Netherlands, 
spoke about an article he published in the renowned journal Science. Keese claimed that people‟s 
behaviour has clear causes. “There are good reasons for people to believe that the world is 
orderly and non-random,” said Keese. “Most people believe their outcomes are under control, 
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